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Abstract
Markov Switching models are often used to analyse financial returns because
of their ability to capture frequently observed stylised facts. In this paper we
consider a multivariate Student-t version of the model as a viable alternative to
the usual multivariate Gaussian distribution, providing a natural robust extension
that accounts for heavy–tails and time varying non–linear correlations. Moreover,
these modelling assumptions allow us to capture extreme tail co–movements which
are of fundamental importance to assess the underlying dependence structure of
asset returns during extreme events such as financial crisis. In order to capture
risk interdependence among several multiple connected market participants which
may experience contemporaneously distress instances, we provide new multiple risk
interdependence measures generalising the Conditional Value-at-Risk (CoVaR) and
the Conditional Expected Shortfall (CoES) of Adrian and Brunnermeier [6]. Those
measures are analytically evaluated on the predictive distribution of the models in
order to provide a forward–looking risk quantification. Application on a set of U.S.
banks is considered to show that the right specification of the model conditional
distribution along with a multiple risk interdependence measure may help to better
understand how the overall risk is shared among institutions.
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1 Introduction
The recent global financial crisis originated by the U.S. subprime mortgage bubble burst
of August 2007 and the consequent downturn in economic activity leading to the 2008–
2012 global recession, highlighted the strong negative impact of large scale collapse of
financial institutions on other banks as well as on the real economy. After the failure
of Bearn Stearns hedge funds on August 5th, 2007, the threat of total collapse of large
financial institutions, and the consequent downturns in stock markets around the world,
caused a worldwide increase in financial market volatility and a sudden tightening of
the liquidity conditions. The spillover effect of a downturn in the financial system
has been advocated as the main reason for massive public interventions and bailouts
of distressed banks. Bank failures cause direct effects on the real economy because
of their linkage to the manufactory industry through the credit mechanism as well as
the significant role they play as financial intermediaries on the monetary transmission
channel. Notwithstanding, before the 2007–2008 crisis, banking regulation and risk
capital allocation was based on individual risk measures such as the Value-at-Risk
(VaR). Unfortunately, such risk measure fails to consider the institution as part of a
system which might itself experience instability and spread new sources of systemic risk.
Recently, Adrian and Brunnermeier [6] introduced the so called Conditional Value-at-
Risk (CoVaR), as one of the possible measures of systemic risk, which is defined as the
overall Value at Risk (VaR) of an institution conditional on another institution being
under distress. In this way the CoVaR not only captures the overall risk embedded in
each institution, but also reflects individual contributions to the systemic risk, capturing
extreme tail co–movements, see for example Bernardi et al. [14], Girardi and Ergu¨n [32]
and Castro and Ferrari [23]. However, recent financial crisis are characterised by the
contemporaneous distress of several institutions emphasising the difficulty to accurately
measure marginal contributions to overall risk of an institution taken in isolation. The
spillover effect of a financial downturn may propagate through other institutions being
in distress at the same time. As a consequence, new overall risk measures that account
for contemporaneous multiple distress as conditioning events should be delivered.
In this paper, we develop a multivariate model–based approach to measure
the dynamic evolution of tail risk interdependence accounting for the well known
characteristics of financial time series. To achieve this goal, we consider the class of
multivariate Markov Switching Models (MSMs), see e.g. Ang and Bekaert [8], Bulla et
al. [19]. Multivariate MSMs may be recognised as a challenging and promising approach
in modelling financial time series, mainly because of their ability to reproduce some
of the most important stylised facts and to account for nonlinearity and persistence
of the visited states (see e.g. Harris and Ku¨c¸u¨ko¨zmen [35] and Gettinby et al. [30]).
Those features are crucial aspects in market return analysis and risk modelling. Markov
Switching models has been intensively used in literature see e.g. Ryde´n et al. [45], Ang
and Bekaert [8], Bulla and Bulla [20], Bulla et al. [19], Hamilton [33] Hamilton [34].
2
Moreover in their papers, Amisano and Geweke [7] and Geweke and Amisano [31]
showed that MSMs outperform their competitors in predicting daily returns of financial
time series, especially during volatile episodes.
Throughout this paper, we consider both multivariate Gaussian and Student–
t assumptions to model the conditional distribution of the observations. The
choice between the two distributions is empirically tested on real data although the
multivariate Normal specification may be considered a starting point for our analysis.
In fact, it is well known that multivariate Gaussian distributions have some deficiencies
in particular when financial time series and risk assessment problems are considered.
Firstly, they rely on the assumption that each marginal follows a Normal distribution,
which is often unrealistic for daily returns, exhibiting extreme realizations (see e.g.
Bulla [18]). More importantly, as documented in Embrechts et al. [28], non–linearities
or strong deviation from the elliptical and symmetric distribution for the underlying
observed process may affect the association measures and, as a consequence, the
covariance will not capture the complete dependence anymore. Moreover, the tails
of the multivariate Gaussian distribution lead to independent extremes, resulting in
potentially underestimation of the probabilities of simultaneous occurrence of rare
events (see e.g. Cˇizˇek et al. [24], Demarta and McNeil [25] and McNeil et al. [42]).
The latter eventuality may cause incorrect assessment of economic risks which has
played a key role in the ongoing international financial crisis. To overcome all the
above mentioned limitations of the multivariate Gaussian distribution we consider
multivariate Student–t MSMs as a natural robust extension.
Once the modelling framework has been properly set, we develop a consistent
approach to measure tail risk interdependence among institutions. We introduce
Multiple–CoVaR and Multiple–CoES risk measures extending and improving the
Adrian and Brunnermeier’s CoVaR and CoES. The proposed risk measures aim
to capture interconnections among multiple connecting market participants which
is particularly relevant during periods of financial market instability, when several
institutions may contemporaneously experience distress instances. Those measures are
analytically evaluated on the MSM predictive distribution in order to provide a forward–
looking risk quantification. In particular, since the predictive distribution of MSMs is
a finite mixture of the Markovian component densities we provide analytical formula to
compute Multiple–CoVaR and Multiple–CoES assuming that the conditioning financial
event refers to a set of institutions being under distress, under both multivariate
Gaussian and Student–t assumptions. Building risk measures upon multivariate MSMs
allows to differentiate institutions’ tail risk exposure depending on the state of the
economy identified by the latent Markovian process. Moreover, the proposed framework
enables us to capture the time varying exposure of individual institutions with respect
to other institutions’ VaR levels.
The strategy developed in this paper to assess institutions’ risk contributions relies
on the Multiple–∆CoVaR and Multiple–∆CoES. Those marginal contributions are
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measured as the difference between the Multiple–CoVaR (Multiple–CoES) of each
institution j conditional on a given set of different institutions being under distress
and the Multiple–CoVaR (Multiple–CoES) of institution j evaluated when the same
set of conditioning institutions are at their normal state, identified as the median state.
Whenever j is assumed to be the market index, the risk measures introduced throughout
the paper identify the systemic risk.
In evaluating multiple risk measures, different conditioning distress events can be
considered. In order to attribute the overall risk to each participant we apply the
Shapley value methodology. The idea behind the Shapley value, initially proposed
by Shapley [47] in the field of cooperative games, has been previously considered by
Tarashev et al. [49] and Cao [21] in the field of systemic risk attribution. The resulting
Shapley value risk measure is additive which ensures that the final risk allocation is
efficient. This property allows to overcome the deficiency of the standard CoVaR
definition of Adrian and Brunnermeier [6] for which the sum of individual contributions
does not equal the total risk measure, providing misleading informations for policy
purposes.
The developed methodology is applied to five major US banks belonging to the
Standard and Poor’s 500 index in order to assess individual institutions’ marginal
contribution to the systemic risk. Comparing the assumption on the MSM component
density we observe that the Student–t distribution is preferred to the Gaussian one
and this supports the use of fat-tails distributions. Our multivariate Student–t MSM is
able to distinguish and cluster time periods corresponding to different risk–returns
profiles and to model the persistence of visited states. Moreover, we provide the
dynamic evolution of the total systemic risk as well as the marginal contribution of
each considered bank. Concerning the total risk, we find that the overall systemic risk
during the 2007–2009 financial crisis is larger than the total systemic risk during the
European sovereign debt crisis at its peak. Our main empirical result suggests that the
marginal contribution to the systemic risk of individual banks varies through time and
particularly during periods of financial instability it changes dramatically, both in order
of importance and in levels. As a further empirical output, we notice that comparing
the institutions’ risk contribution ordering we observe that the two measures provide
slightly different results. This discordance can be probably ascribable to the known
coherence deficiency of the VaR that rebounds on the CoVaR.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces the
multivariate Gaussian and Student–t MSMs and provides the estimation methodology.
Section 3 provides some useful results concerning the marginal and conditional
distributions of multivariate mixtures and the new risk measures we introduce, while
Section 4 details the Shapley value methodology to evaluate individual contributions
to systemic risk. Section 5 presents results based on an illustrative basket of five major
US banks belonging to the S&P500 composite index. Section 6 concludes.
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2 Markov switching models
We provide a brief introduction to MSMs setup, focusing on multivariate Gaussian and
Sudent–t distribution assumption. For an up to date review of MSMs see e.g. Cappe´
et al. [22], Zucchini and MacDonald [50] and Dymarski [27].
2.1 Model setup
In this section we illustrate the formulation of the MSM for multivariate continuous
response variables. Let {Yt, t = 1, . . . , T} denote a sequence of multivariate
observations, where Yt = {Y1,t,Y2,t, . . . ,Yp,T } ∈ Rp, while {St, t = 1, . . . , T} denotes a
Markov chain defined on the state space {1, 2, . . . , L}. A MSM is a stochastic process
consisting of two parts: the underlying unobserved process {St}, fulfilling the Markov
property, i.e.
P (St = st | S1 = s1,S2 = s2, . . . ,St−1 = st−1) = P (St = st | St−1 = st−1) ,
and the state–dependent observation process {Yt} for which the conditional
independence property, i.e.
f (Yt = yt | Y1 = y1, . . . ,Yt−1 = yt−1,S1 = s1, . . . ,St = st) = f (Yt = yt | St = st) ,
holds, where f (·) is a generic probability density function.
The literature on MSMs for continuous data is dominated by Gaussian MSMs
(Hamilton [33], Ryde´n et al. [45], Bialkowski [15], Bartolucci and Farcomeni [11]), with
few exceptions (Bartolucci and Farcomeni [10] and Lagona and Picone [39]). Under the
Gaussian assumption, the state–specific distribution of Yt is given by
Yt | St = st ∼ Np
(
µst ,Σst
)
(2.1)
where Np
(
µst ,Σst
)
denotes the multivariate Gaussian distribution with mean µst and
covariance matrix Σst.
Time series models for financial data should account for several well known
departures from normality such as heavy–tails, robustness to outliers, and the ability
of capturing extreme events. Those reasons motivate our choice of the multivariate
Student–t assumption for the MSM:
Yt | St = st ∼ Tp
(
µst ,Σst , νst
)
(2.2)
where Tp
(
µst ,Σst , νst
)
denotes the multivariate Student–t distribution with mean µst ,
scale matrix Σst and degrees of freedom equalt to νst . As νst tends to infinity, the
distribution in equation (2.2) approaches the Gaussian distribution, with mean µst and
variance–covariance matrixΣst . Hence the parameter νst may be viewed as a robustness
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tuning parameter, which need to be estimated along with all other model parameters.
For further technical purposes, we remind that the multivariate Student-t
distribution can be expressed as a scale mixture of multivariate Gaussian distributions
Yt | (St = st,Wt = wt) ∼ Np
(
µst ,
Σst
wt
)
, (2.3)
where the mixing variables {Wt, t = 1, 2, . . . , T} are independent and identically
distributed random variables having distribution
Wt | St = st ∼ G
(
1
2
νst ,
1
2
νst
)
(2.4)
with G (α, β) denoting the Gamma distribution with parameters α > 0 and β > 0, see
e.g. Kotz and Nadarajah [37].
In order to complete the model setup, we need to specify the Markov chain which
determines the hidden state at each time point t. To this purpose let denote with
ql,k = P (St = k | St−1 = l), ∀l, k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , L} the probability that state k is visited
at time t given that at time t − 1 the chain was visiting state l. We indicate with
δl = P (S1 = l) the initial probability of being in state l = {1, 2, . . . , L} at time 1, and
we refer to Q = {ql,k} as the transition probability matrix of the Markov chain.
2.2 Estimation and inference
The MSM parameters are generally estimated using the maximum–likelihood method,
see for example McLachlan and Peel [41] and Cappe´ et al. [22]. The likelihood of a MSM
can be expressed in a closed–form formula, even in a relatively general framework. Let
θ = {µl,Σl, νl,Q, δ, l = 1, 2, . . . , L} be the set of all model parameters and let f (yt)
denote a diagonal matrix with conditional probabilities f (Yt = yt | St = st) on the
main diagonal, then, the likelihood of a MSM can be written as
L (θ) = δf (y1)Qf (y2)Q . . . f (yT−1)Qf(yT )1′. (2.5)
Finding the value of the parameters θ that maximize the log–transformation of equation
(2.5) under the constraints
∑L
l=1 δl = 1 and
∑K
k=1 ql,k = 1, is not an easy problem
since (2.5) is not analytically available. Instead, it is straigthforward to find solutions
of equation (2.5) using the Expectaton–Maximization (EM) algorithm of Dempster
et al. [26]. Hereafter we focus on the EM algorithm which has been previously
applied to the case of finite mixtures of univariate Student–t distributions by Peel
and McLachlan [43].
For the purpose of application of the EM algorithm the vector of observations yt, t =
1, 2, . . . , T is regarded as being incomplete. Following the implementation described in
Peel and McLachlan [43] in a finite mixture context, two missing data structures are
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consequently introduced. The first one is related to the unobservable Markovian states,
i.e. zt = (zt,1, zt,2, . . . , zt,L) and zzt = (zzt,1,1, zzt,1,2, . . . , zzt,l,k, . . . , zzt,L,L) defined as
zt,l =
{
1 if St = l
0 otherwise
zzt,l,k =
{
1 if St−1 = l,St = k
0 otherwise.
The second type of missing data structure is wt, ∀t = 1, 2, . . . , T relies to the scale
mixture representation in equations (2.3)-(2.4) which are assumed to be conditionally
independent given the component labels zl,t, l = 1, 2, . . . , L,∀t = 1, 2, . . . , T .
Augmenting the observations {Yt, t = 1, 2, . . . , T} with the latent variables
{wt, ztl, zzt,l,k, t = 1, 2, . . . , T ; l = 1, . . . , L} gives the following complete–data log–
likelihood:
logLc (θ) =
L∑
l=1
z1,l log (δl)
+
L∑
l=1
L∑
k=1
T∑
t=1
zzt,l,k log (ql,k)
+
L∑
l=1
T∑
t=1
zt,l
{
−p
2
log (2pi)− 1
2
log |Σl| − wt
2
(yt − µl)TΣ−1l (yt − µl)
}
+
L∑
l=1
T∑
t=1
zt,l
{νl
2
log
(νl
2
)
− log Γ
(νl
2
)}
+
L∑
l=1
T∑
t=1
zt,l
{νl
2
(log(wt)− wt) +
(p
2
− 1
)
log (wt)
}
. (2.6)
The EM algorithm consists of two major steps, one for expectation (E–step) and one for
maximization (M–step), see McLachlan and Krishnan [40]. At the (m+ 1)–th iteration
the EM algorithm proceeds as follows:
E–step: computes the conditional expectation of the complete–data log–likelihood (2.6)
given the observed data {yt}Tt and the m–th iteration θ(m) parameters estimates
Q
(
θ,θ(m)
)
= E
θ(m)
[
logLc (θ) | {yt}Tt
]
(2.7)
M–step: choose θ(m+1) by maximising (2.7) with respect to θ
θ(m+1) = argmax
θ
Q
(
θ,θ(m)
)
. (2.8)
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One nice feature of the EM algorithm is that the solution of the M–step exists
analytically for Gaussian and Student–t MSMs, with the exception of the degrees–
of–freedom νl, l = 1, 2, . . . , L. One possible solution for estimating νl is to adopt the
approximation provided in Shoham [46] for mixtures of Student–t distributions. In
Appendix A we sketch the corresponding EM algorithm.
3 Risk measures
As discussed in the Introduction, one of the main contribution of this paper is a model–
based approach to quantify interdependence tail risk. Assessing financial risks requires
the appropriate definition of risk measures accounting for potential spillover effects
among institutions belonging to a given financial market. After the 2007–2008 global
financial crisis a large stream of literature has been devoted to this topic: see for
example the Marginal Expected Shortfall risk measure (MES) of Acharya et al. [5],
the Systemic–RISK measure (SRISK) jointly proposed by Brownlees and Engle [17]
and Acharya et al. [4], for a portfolio approach to measure the total overall system–
wide risk. Acharya and Richardson [3], Huang et al. [36], Billio et al. [16] instead
measure the marginal contribution of individual institutions to the systemic risk. In
this paper we follow this latter stream of literature focusing in particular on the recent
work of Adrian and Brunnermeier [6] who introduce the CoVaR approach to measure
overall risk contributions of individual institutions. The original definition of CoVaR
at τ–level, i.e. CoVaRτi|j, considers two different institutions i and j, such that
P
(
Yi ≤ CoVaRτi|j | Yj = VaRτj
)
= τ (3.1)
where Yi and Yj denote the institution i and j returns and VaR
τ
j denotes the “univariate
marginal” Value–at–Risk of asset j. If i coincides with the whole financial system, the
CoVaR becomes the VaR of the financial system conditional on a single institution j
being in financial distress and represents the basis to understand how systemic risk
shares among institutions.
Recent financial crisis are characterised by the contemporaneous default of several
institutions underlying the exigence of risk measures accounting for joint occurrence of
extreme losses. For this reason in Subsection 3.3 we introduce two new systemic risk
measures; the first one is the Multiple–CoVaR, extending the CoVaR of Adrian and
Brunnermeier [6] to the case where more than a single institution experiences distress
instances. The second one is the Multiple–CoES which generalizes the τ–level CoESτi|j
of Adrian and Brunnermeier [6] i.e.
CoESτi|j ≡ E
(
Yi | Yi ≤ yˆτi ,Yj = ESτj
)
(3.2)
where ESτj is the univariate marginal expected shortfall of asset j. By definition,
the Multiple–CoVaR and Multiple–CoES rely on the conditional and marginal return
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distributions. In what follows we embed the proposed risk measures in the MS
framework defined in the previous Section 2.1. In particular, we focus on the
“predictive” distribution of the Markov–Switching model and we provide analytical
expressions for marginal and conditional predictive distributions which allows us to
give explicit formulae for Multiple–CoVaR and Multiple–CoES under the Gaussian
and Student-t assumptions.
3.1 Preliminary results
In this subsection we firstly recall a known result on the h–steps ahead “predictive”
distribution for the MSM. We then use such a result to prove two theorems concerning
its marginals and conditionals distributions under the multivariate Gaussian and
multivariate t assumption for the component specific density.
The h-step ahead distribution of the observed process yt+h at time t + h, given
information up to time t, Ft, is a finite mixture of component specific predictive
distributions, (see e.g. Zucchini and MacDonald [50])
p (yt+h | Ft) =
L∑
l=1
pi
(h)
l f (yt+h | St+h = l) (3.3)
with mixing weights
pi
(h)
l =
L∑
j=1
Qhj,lP (St = j | Ft) , (3.4)
where Qhj,l is the (j, l)-th entry of the Markovian transition matrix Q to the power h.
Under multivariate Gaussian and Student–t assumptions on f (yt+h | St+h) we have
the following results.
Theorem 3.1 (Conditional and marginal distributions for Multivariate
Gaussian Mixtures). Let Y be a p-dimensional Gaussian mixture, i.e. Y ∼∑L
l=1 ηlNp (y | µl,Σl), and assume Y partitioned into Y =
[
YT1 ,Y
T
2
]T
, where Y1
and Y2 are of dimension dim (Y1) = p1 and dim (Y2) = p2 = p − p1, respectively.
The mean vectors µl and the variance-covariance matrices Σl for l = 1, 2, . . . , L are
partitioned accordingly to µl =
[
µ1Tl ,µ
2T
l
]T
and Σl =
[
Σ
(1,1)
l Σ
(1,2)
l
Σ
(2,1)
l Σ
(2,2)
l
]
, respectively,
where Σ
(2,2)
l is a p2 × p2 positive definite matrix. Then:
(i) the marginal distribution of Y2 is
fY2 (y2) =
L∑
l=1
ηlNp2
(
y2 | µ2l ,Σ(2,2)l
)
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(ii) the conditional distribution of Y1 given Y2 = y2 is
fY1 (y1 | Y2 = y2) =
L∑
l=1
η˜l (y2)Np1
(
y1 | µ1|2l (y2) ,Σ1|2l
)
,
where the mixing weights have the following expression
η˜l (y2) =
ηlNp2
(
y2 | µ2l ,Σ(2,2)l
)
∑L
l=1 ηlNp2
(
y2 | µ2l ,Σ(2,2)l
) , (3.5)
and the conditional moments of each components are
µ
1|2
l (y2) = µ
1
l +Σ
(1,2)
l Σ
(2,2)−1
l
(
y2 − µ2l
)
(3.6)
Σ
1|2
l = Σ
(1,1)
l −Σ(1,2)l Σ(2,2)
−1
l Σ
(2,1)
l , ∀l = 1, 2, . . . , L. (3.7)
Proof.
(i) The first result follows from standard integration.
(ii) Concerning the second result, applying result (i) we can factorize the joint density
in the following way:
fY1|Y2=y2 (y2) =
fY1,Y2 (y1,y2)
fY2 (y2)
=
∑L
l=1 ηlNp2
(
y2 | µ2l ,Σ2l
)Np1 (Y1 | Y2 = y2,µ1|2l (y2) ,Σ1|2l )∑L
l=1 ηlNp2
(
y2 | µ2l ,Σ(2,2)l
)
which is a mixture of multivariate Gaussian distributions with mixing proportions
defined as in equation (3.5).
✷✷
Theorem 3.2 (Conditional and marginal distributions for Multivariate
Student-t Mixtures). Let Y be a p-dimensional Student–t mixture, i.e. Y ∼∑L
l=1 ηlTp (y | µl,Σl, νl), and assume Y partitioned into Y =
[
YT1 ,Y
T
2
]T
, where Y1
and Y2 are of dimension dim (Y1) = p1 and dim (Y2) = p2 = p − p1, respectively.
The location parameter vectors µl and the scale matrices Σl for l = 1, 2, . . . , L are
partitioned accordingly to µl =
[
µ1Tl ,µ
2T
l
]T
and Σl =
[
Σ
(1,1)
l Σ
(1,2)
l
Σ
(2,1)
l Σ
(2,2)
l
]
, respectively,
where Σ
(2,2)
l is a p2 × p2 positive definite matrix. Then:
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(i) the marginal distribution of Y2 is
fY2 (y2) =
L∑
l=1
ηlTp2
(
y2 | µ2l ,Σ(2,2)l , νl
)
(ii) the conditional distribution of Y1 given Y2 = y2 is
fY1 (y1 | Y2 = y2) =
L∑
l=1
η˜l (y2)Tp1
(
y1 | µ1|2l (y2) ,Σ∗l , p1 + νl
)
,
where Σ∗ =
[
1 + 1
νl
(
y2 − µ2l
)T
Σ
(2,2)−1
l
(
y2 − µ2l
)]
Σ
1|2
l
νl
p1+νl
, the mixing weights
have the following expression
η˜l (y2) =
ηlTp2
(
y2 | µ2l ,Σ(2,2)l , νl
)
∑L
l=1 ηlTp2
(
y2 | µ2l ,Σ(2,2)l , νl
) , (3.8)
and µ
1|2
l and Σ
1|2
l are defined as in equations (3.6) and (3.7) respectively.
Proof.
(i) The first result follows from standard integration, using the result for the marginal
distribution of multivariate Student-t distributions provided by Sutradhar [48].
(ii) Concerning the second part, we can factorize the joint Student-t density as in
Theorem 3.1 and using the result for the conditional distribution of multivariate
Student–t distributions provided by Sutradhar [48], the results follows immediately.
✷✷
In what follows we give results on univariate VaR and ES measures usefull to introduce
our generalization of CoVaR and CoES risk measures.
3.2 Marginal risk measures: VaR and ES
The Value–at–Risk for a risky asset at a given confidence level τ is the (1− τ)−quantile
of the distribution of the asset return, and measures the minimum loss that can occur
in the (1− τ) × 100% of worst cases. When the random variable Y has an absolutely
continuous density function fY (y) with cumulative density function FY (y), the VaR can
be calculated by VaRτ (Y) ≡ yˆτ = F−1Y (1− τ). If the distribution of Y is a Gaussian
or Student–t mixture it is straightforward to evaluate the VaR as the distribution’s
quantile. In his paper, Artzner [9], shows that VaR suffers for the lack of subadditivity
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property, and does not take into account for the benefits deriving from diversification.
In principle, well diversified portfolios of risky assets should be less risky than non-
diversified ones. To overcome this problem, Acerbi [1] introduced the so-called “spectral
risk measures”, and, among those, the Expected Shortfall (ES). The ES is a coherent
risk measure (see Acerbi and Tasche [2]) that can be defined as the expected value of
Y truncated below the VaR. It can be calculated as the Tail Conditional Expectation
(TCE) of Y conditioned at its VaR level, i.e. the expected value of Y conditional
on being below a given threshold yˆ, ESτ (Y) ≡ TCEY (yˆτ ). When compared to the
VaR risk measure, the ES provides a more conservative measure of risk for the same
degree of confidence level, and it provides an effective tool for analysing the tail of
the distribution. Bernardi [13] shows that, under the Gaussian mixture distribution
TCEY (yˆ
τ ) is a convex linear combination of component specific TCE. In what follows
we provide a similar result under the Student–t assumption.
Proposition 3.1 (TCE for univariate Student-t mixtures). Let Y be a univariate
Student–t mixture, i.e. Y ∼∑Ll=1 ηlSt (y | µl, σ2l , νl), then the TCEY (yˆτ ) is given by
TCEY (yˆ
τ ) =
L∑
l=1
pilTCEY,l (yˆ
τ )
where
TCEY,l (yˆ
τ ) =
ν
1
2
νl
l
2
√
pi
Γ
(
1
2 (νl − 1)
)
Γ
(
1
2νl
) [νl + ( yˆ− µl
σl
)2]− 12 (νl−1)
(3.9)
with weights pil = ηl
FY(yˆτ ,µl,σ2l ,νl)∑L
l=1 ηlFY(yˆτ ,µl,σ2l ,νl)
, ∀l = 1, 2, . . . , L, and ∑Ll=1 pil = 1 where
FY
(
yˆτ , µ, σ2, ν
)
is the cdf of a Student–t random variable with parameters
(
µ, σ2, ν
)
evaluated at yˆτ .
Proof. See the Appendix B. ✷✷
The following corollary provides formula for ES under Student–t mixtures.
Corollary 3.1. Under the same assumptions of Proposition 3.1 we have
ESτ (Y) ≡ TCEY (yˆτ ) = 1
τ
L∑
l=1
pil (yˆ
τ ) TCEY,l (yˆ
τ ) , (3.10)
with pil (yˆ
τ ) = ηlF
(
yˆτ , µl, σ
2
l , νl
)
, ∀l = 1, 2, . . . , L.
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3.3 Conditional risk measures: MCoVaR and MCoES
As discussed at the beginning of this section, CoVaR and CoES represent measures
of extreme events interdependence which go beyond traditional idiosyncratic risk
measures to capture potential spillover effects among institutions. CoVaR and CoES
essentially represent two by two risk measures where each individual contribution is
independent on other market participants’ distress. When the main focus is to analyse
the global systemic risk it is of fundamental importance to capture interconnections
among multiple connecting market participants. This is more relevant during periods
of financial market crisis, when several institutions may contemporaneously experience
distress instances. For this reason we propose a generalisation of the Adrian and
Brunnermeier’s CoVaR and CoES, namely Multiple–CoVaR (MCoVaR) and Multiple–
CoES (MCoES) for multivariate Markov–Switching models. A similar multiple CoVaR
has been previously introduced by Cao [21].
Let S = {1, 2, . . . , p} be a set of p institutions, we assume that the conditioning event
is a set of d institutions under distress indexed by Jd = {j1, j2, . . . , jd} ⊂ dCp−1,
where dCp−1 is the set of all possible combinations of p − 1 elements of class d, with
d ≤ p − 1. Moreover, assuming that institution i ∈ S with i /∈ Jd and Jn = Jd is
the set of institutions being at the “normal” state, we define the “Multiple–CoVaR”,
MCoVaR
τ1|τ2
i|Jd
as follows.
Definition 3.1. Let Y = (Y1,Y2, . . . ,Yi, . . . ,Yp) be the vector of institution returns,
then MCoVaR
τ1|τ2
i|Jd
≡ CoVaRτ1
(
Yi | YJd = yˆτ2Jd ,YJn = yˆ0.5Jn
)
is the Value-at-Risk of
institution i ∈ S, conditional on the set of institutions Jd being at their individual
VaRτ2-level yˆ
τ2
Jd
=
(
yˆτ2j1 , yˆ
τ2
j2
, . . . , yˆτ2jd
)
and the set of institutions Jn = Jd being at
their individual VaR0.5-level yˆ
0.5
Jn
=
(
yˆ0.5jd+1 , yˆ
0.5
j2
, . . . , yˆ0.5jp−1
)
i.e., MCoVaR
τ1|τ2
i|Jd
satisfies
the following equation
P
(
Yi ≤ MCoVaRτ1|τ2i|Jd | YJd = yˆ
τ2
Jd
,YJn = yˆ
0.5
Jn
)
= τ1, ∀i = 1, 2, . . . , p. (3.11)
We remind that MCoVaR
τ1|τ2
i|Jd
is the τ1–quantile of the conditional predictive
distribution Yi | YJd = yˆτ2Jd ,YJn = yˆ0.5Jn defined in equations (3.3)–(3.4). In order
to calculate it we use results stated in Teorem 3.1 for the Gaussian case and Theorem
3.2 for the Student–t case by inverting the following cdfs:
FYi
(
Yi | YJd = yˆτ2Jd ,YJn = yˆ0.5Jn
)
=
L∑
l=1
η˜l
(
yˆ
τ2
Jd
, yˆ0.5Jn
)
FlYi
(
Yi | YJd = yˆτ2Jd ,YJn = yˆ
0.5
Jn
)
(3.12)
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where the component weights η˜l
(
yˆ
τ2
Jd
, yˆ0.5Jn
)
are defined as in equations (3.5)–
(3.8) depending on the assumption made on the component densities, and
FlYi
(
Yi | YJd = yˆτ2Jd ,YJn = yˆ0.5Jn
)
is the l–th component cdf.
The lack of subadditivity property of the VaR suggests to introduce, in addition
to the CoVaR, the Conditional Expected Shortfall (CoES), defined by Adrian and
Brunnermeier [6] for two institutions i and j, as the ES evaluated on the conditional
distribution of Yi given Yj. The following definition characterise the extension of CoES
to the Multiple–CoES (MCoES) accounting for multiple contemporaneous distress
events.
Definition 3.2. Let Y = (Y1,Y2, . . . ,Yp) be the vector of institution returns, then the
MCoES
τ1|τ2
i|Jd
≡ CoESτ1
(
Yi | YJd = ψ̂yJd
(
yˆτ2Jn
)
,YJn = ψ̂yJn
(
yˆ0.5Jn
))
is the Expected Shortfall of institution i ∈ S, conditional on the set of institutions
Jd being at their individual ESτ2-level ψ̂yJd
(
yˆ
τ2
Jd
)
=(
ψˆyj1
(
yˆτ2j1
)
, ψˆyj2
(
yˆτ2j2
)
, . . . , ψˆyjd
(
yˆτ2jd
))
and the set of institutions Jn being at their
individual ES0.5–level ψ̂yJn
(
yˆ
τ2
Jn
)
=
(
ψˆyjd+1
(
yˆτ2j1
)
, ψˆyj2
(
yˆτ2j2
)
, . . . , ψˆyjp−1
(
yˆτ2jp−1
))
,
with ψˆyj
(
yˆτj
)
≡ ESτ (Yj), ∀j = 1, 2, . . . , d, and can be defined in the following way
MCoES
τ1|τ2
i|Jd
≡ E
(
Yi | Yi ≤ yˆτ1i ,YJd = ψ̂yJd
(
yˆ
τ2
Jd
)
,YJn = ψ̂yJn
(
yˆ0.5Jn
))
. (3.13)
In the MS framework considered here the CoES reduces to the following weighted
average
MCoES
τ1|τ2
i|Jd
=
1
τ1
L∑
l=1
η˜l
(
ψ̂yJd
(
yˆτ2Jd
)
, ψ̂yJn
(
yˆ0.5Jn
))
×ψ̂lyi
(
yˆτ1i | ψ̂yJd
(
yˆτ2Jd
)
, ψ̂yJn
(
yˆ0.5Jn
))
, (3.14)
where
(i) ψ̂
l
yi
(
yˆτ1i | ψ̂yJd
(
yˆ
τ2
Jd
)
, ψ̂yJn
(
yˆ0.5Jn
))
, for l = 1, 2, . . . , L is the l–th component
specific ES of the predictive distribution of Yi conditional on the set of institutions
Jd being at their individual ESτ2–level, YJd = ψ̂yJd
(
yˆ
τ2
Jd
)
and the set of
institutions Jn being at their individual ES0.5–level, YJn = ψ̂yJn
(
yˆ0.5Jn
)
.
14
(ii) η˜l
(
ψ̂yJd
(
yˆ
τ2
Jd
)
, ψ̂yJn
(
yˆ0.5Jn
))
is the weight associated to the l–th component ES
whose analytical expression can be found by plugging ψ̂yJd
(
yˆτ2Jd
)
and ψ̂yJn
(
yˆ0.5Jn
)
into equation (3.5) and (3.8) for the multivariate Gaussian and and multivariate
t MSM respectively.
4 Individual contributions to overall risk
When dealing with overall risk measures, it is important to quantify the marginal
contribution of individual institutions to the overall risk. In their seminal paper, Adrian
and Brunnermeier [6] suggest that such marginal contribution can be evaluated by the
∆CoVaR. Within their framework, where only two asset are considered, the ∆CoVaR is
defined as the difference between the CoVaR of institution i conditional on institution
j being under distress and the CoVaR of the same institution i when institution
j is at its median state. In this case the median state identifies the non–distress
events of institution j. However, since during periods of financial instability several
institutions may experience financial distress at the same time, following the same
idea behind MCoVaR (MCoES), it is straightforward to generalise ∆CoVaR (∆CoES)
to Multiple–∆CoVaR (Multiple–∆CoES). Hence, we define the “Multiple–∆CoVaR”,
∆MCoVaR
τ1|τ2
i|Jd
as follows:
∆MCoVaR
τ1|τ2
i|Jd
= CoVaRτ1
(
Yi | YJd = yˆτ2Jd ,YJn = yˆ0.5Jn
)
−
CoVaRτ1
(
Yi | YJd∪Jn = yˆ0.5Jd∪Jn
)
(4.1)
∀i = 1, 2, . . . , p. The ∆MCoVaRτ1|τ2
i|Jd
gives a more complete information on which
combination of distressed institutions provides the largest contribution to the risk of
the i-th institution and conveys a sharpened signal to the regulator. It is worth noting
that when Jd = S \ {i} the proposed ∆MCoVaR risk measure quantifies the total risk
contribution to the i−th institution, which is useful to assess the total amount of risk.
Note also that when d = 1, the ∆MCoVaR does not coincide with the Adrian and
Brunnermeier [6] ∆CoVaR definition.
Following a similar idea, we can define the “Multiple–∆CoES”, ∆MCoES
τ1|τ2
i|Jd
, as
follows
∆MCoES
τ1|τ2
i|Jd
= CoES
τ1|τ2
i|Jd
(
Yi | YJd = yˆτ2Jd ,YJn = yˆ50%Jn
)
−
CoES
τ1|τ2
i|Jd
(
Yi | Yi ≤ ψˆyi (yˆτ1i ) ,YJd∪Jn = yˆ50%Jd∪Jn
)
. (4.2)
In a multivariate environment, it is of fundamental importance to determine how the
total risk shares among individual market participants. This can be accomplished by
using the Shapley value theory, see e.g. Shapley [47] described in the next subsection
which decomposes the total risk into individuals contributions.
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4.1 Shapley Value
The Shapley value, initially formulated in a cooperative game theory approach, is used
in this paper to efficiently allocate the overall risk among institutions belonging to the
financial system. The Shapley value has been previously applied in a different context
by Koylouglu and Stoker [38], and as a measure to attributing systemic risk by Tarashev
et al. [49] and Cao [21].
The Shapley value methodology has been proposed to share utility or a cost among
participant of a cooperative game where players can encourage cooperative behaviour
and make coalitions. When the Shapley value is used as risk distributor the total gain
of the coalition coincides with the overall risk generated by the financial system.
In a cooperative game, ϑi (H), i = 1, 2, . . . , p, denotes the loss function of individual
i, generated by group H ⊂ S \ {i}, where S = {1, 2, . . . , p} as defined in the previous
section and p is the total number of institutions. In our risk measurement framework,
the loss function ϑi : R
2p −→ R+ coincides with the Multiple–∆CoVaR or the Multiple–
∆CoES and assigns to each of the 2p−1 possible groups of institutions H its marginal
contribution to the overall risk in such a way that ϑi (S \ {i}) is the total risk of
institution i ∈ S. In the cooperative game theory framework the function ϑi (·) should
be super–additive and such that ϑi (∅) = 0, where ∅ is the null set. This means
that the contribution of a union of disjoint coalitions is not less than the sum of the
coalition’s separate values and that the contribution of an “empty” coalition is zero.
The Shapley value is one of the possible ways to distribute the total risk of
institution i ∈ S, i.e. ϑi (S \ {i}), among all the remaining institutions belonging to the
financial system assuming that they all collaborate. In particular, the Shapley value
of institution j ∈ S \ {i}, denoted by ShVi (j), determines the amount of institution
j’s risk contribution on institution i and satisfies the “individual rationality condition”,
i.e. ShVi (j) ≥ ϑi ({j}), ∀i, j ∈ S, with j 6= i, where ϑi ({j}) is the marginal risk
contribution of institution j if it does not cooperate, and the “collective rationality
condition”, i.e.
∑p
j=1 ShVi (j) = ϑi (S), ∀i ∈ S. The Shapley values are obtained as
ShVi (j) =
1
|S \ {i} |!
∑
H⊂S\{i,j}
|H|! (|S \ {i} | − |H| − 1)! [ϑi (H ∪ {j})− ϑi (H)] (4.3)
for i, j = 1, 2, . . . , p with j 6= i, where the sum extends over all the subsets H of S \ {i}
not containing institution j. The Shapley values are the shares of each institution from
the value of the loss function when all players cooperate and possesses the following
desirable properties.
1. Efficiency :
∑p
j=1 ShVi (j) = ϑi (S \ {i}), ∀i ∈ S. The efficiency axiom states
that the total risk of institution i is distributed among all the remaining market
participants with no loss and no gains. The overwhelming importance of this
property can be clearly understood when considering macro prudential regulation.
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Additive risk measures imply that supervisors will not penalise the economy for
no reasons.
2. Symmetry : if k 6= i, j such that ϑi (H ∪ {j}) = ϑi (H∪ {k}), ∀H such that
i, j, k /∈ H, then ShVi (j) = ShVi (k). The symmetry axioms simply states that
the Shapley value is permutation invariant and induces a fairness property of the
resulting risk distributor. This means that if the marginal risk contribution of
any two institutions and for any subset H is the same, then their Shapley values
should be the same.
3. Dummy axiom: if ϑi (H ∪ {j}) = ϑi ({j}), ∀j ∈ H and H 6⊃ i, then ShVi (j) =
ϑi ({j}). This property means that if the risk of institution j is independent of
any other institutions’ risk conditionally on institution i, then the risk share of j
should be exactly equal to its risk alone. This is the case where standard CoVaR
of Adrian and Brunnermeier [6] coincides with the Shapley value methodology.
As argued by Cao [21], since in general the risk measure of institution j is not
conditionally orthogonal of any other institutions’ risk, this implies that the
standard CoVaR approach and the Shapley value marginal contribution does
not delivers the same risk ordering.
4. Linearity (or additivity): If j and k, with j, k ∈ H and j 6= k are two different
institutions described by the functions ϑi (j) and ϑi (k), with ϑi (j) 6= ϑi (k), such
that their linear combination delivers a new function ϑ˜i = wjϑi (j) + wkϑi (k),
with wl > 0,∀l = {j, k}, then the distributed risks should equal the weighted
average of individual risk contribution as evaluated by their respective Shapley
values, i.e. ShVi
(
θ˜i
)
= wjShVi (j) + wkShVi (k).
5. Zero player : a player is null if none of the subsets H contains j. A null player
receives zero risk contribution.
5 Empirical Analysis
We apply the econometric framework and the methodology described in previous
sections to examine the systemic risk in the US banking system.
5.1 Data
We consider a panel of US Banks belonging to the Standard and Poor’s Composite
Index, S&P500. The basket consists on weekly returns of five among the major US
Banks by capitalization, covering the period from January 2nd, 1987 to June 28th,
2013: BAC (Bank of America Corp), BK (The Bank of New York Mellow Corp.), C
(Citigroup Inc.), JPM (JPMorgan Chase & Co.) and WFC (Wells Fargo). All the time
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Name Min Max Mean×103 Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis 1% Str. Lev. JB
BAC -0.593 0.607 0.697 0.059 -0.277 28.671 -0.151 38431.115
BK -0.246 0.260 1.291 0.046 -0.061 6.121 -0.130 568.713
C -0.926 0.788 0.847 0.069 -1.422 51.510 -0.155 137644.599
JPM -0.417 0.399 0.980 0.054 -0.175 11.499 -0.130 4217.499
WFC -0.368 0.482 2.411 0.047 0.273 20.971 -0.123 18842.051
S&P500 -0.201 0.114 1.377 0.024 -0.860 9.600 -0.070 2711.287
Table 1: Summary statistics of five US banks in the panel and the SP&500 index, for the
period form January, 2nd 1987 till June, 28th 2013. The eight column, denoted by “1% Str.
Lev.” is the 1% empirical quantile of the returns distribution, while the last column, denoted
by “JB” is the value of the Jarque-Bera´ test-statistics.
series are from the Bloomberg Database. Descriptive statistics for the data are provided
in Table 1. In line with stylised facts of financial time series, the returns are positively
skewed (except for Citigroup (C), which is hugely negatively skewed) and leptokurtic,
indicating that they are not normally distributed. In addition, the Jarque–Bera (JB)
statistic confirms the departure from normality for all return series at the 1% level of
significance. Moreover, the presence of large volatility clusters followed by periods of
low volatility is documented by the data. This facts are coherent with the presence of
different regimes of “bull” and “bear” market conditions.
The goal is to analyse how the systemic risk spreads among the different institutions
by inspecting the time evolution of the risk measures introduced in previous sections.
We would examine whether stock market co-movements have changed over time, with
a focus on the crisis periods. On the one hand, we expect that the global nature of the
financial crisis might imply that the co–movements become stronger, with an increase
in the long–run risks. On the other hand, given the heterogeneous composition of
the considered panel, where institutions strongly differ by market capitalisation and
other individual characteristics, (some observable like the business core, some other
not observable like debt composition or the level of market linkage) we would expect
that different banks were hit rather unequally by the 2007–2008 global financial crisis.
For example, by looking at the kurtosis index in Table 1 we observe that Citigroup (C)
has much larger fat tails than other banks in the panel, and may be more affected by
the financial crisis than other banks do.
The top panel in Figure 1 shows the time series of cumulative returns for all the
considered assets, from January 2nd, 1987 till the end of the sample. Vertical dotted
lines refer to the following events: the “Black Monday” (October 19, 1987), the “Black
Wednesday” (September 16, 1992), the Asian crisis (July, 1997), the Russian crisis
(August, 1998), the September 11–2001 shock, the onset of the mortgage subprime
crisis identified by the Bear Stearns hedge funds collapse (August 5, 2007), the Bear
Stearns acquisition by JP Morgan Chase, (March 16, 2008) and the Lehman’s failure
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(September 15, 2008), the peak of the onset of the recent global financial crisis (March
9, 2009) and the European sovereign–debt crisis of April 2010 (April 23, 2010, Greek
crisis). The figure gives insights about the effect of crisis periods in each institutions
and the overall market represented by the S&P500 composite index (dark dotted line).
After the 2001 Twin Towers attack till the middle of 2007, the US financial system
experienced a long period of small perturbations and stability ended shortly after the
collapse of two Bear Stearns hedge funds in early August 2007. Starting from August
2007, the financial market experiences a huge fall, the subprime mortgage crisis that led
to a financial crisis and subsequent recession that began in 2008. Several major financial
institutions collapsed in September 2008, with significant disruption in the flow of credit
to businesses and consumers and the onset of a severe global recession. The system
hit the bottom in March 2009, and then started a slow recovery which culminated just
before the European sovereign–debt crisis of April 2010. It is interesting to note that,
since the beginning of the 2007 global crisis all the considered institutions, as well as the
market index, experienced huge capital losses with Citigroup (C) (green line) being the
most affected by the crisis. Moreover, Citigroup (C), JP Morgan (JPM) (yellow line)
and Bank of America Corp (BAC) (red line) become more correlated after European
sovereign–debt crisis, displaying similar trends.
5.2 Full sample estimation results
To account for all observed data features, we estimate multivariate Gaussian and
Student–t Markov Switching models over the entire sample period. A fundamental
problem in fitting MS models is the choice of the number of latent states. In the
literature on latent variables, the most used model selection tools are the Akaike
Information Criterion (AIC) and the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC). These
two indexes involve penalisation terms depending on the number of non–redundant
parameters (see e.g. Ryde´n [44]).
In Table 2 we report the maximum log-likelihood, AIC, and BIC for Gaussian and
Student–t MSMs when the number of hidden states varies from 2 to 5. For each value
of L, we use 20 random starting points to initialise model parameters, and we report
the results corresponding to the best solution in terms of log–likelihood. We stop the
algorithms when the increase in the log–likelihood is less than 10−5; for each of the two
models, whenever possible, we use the same starting points.
Table 2 highlights that the Student–t MSMs account for the asymmetry and kurtosis
displayed by the observed data in a more parsimonious way as compared to the Gaussian
alternatives. In fact, the selected model is the Student–t with L = 4. Table 3 and 4
summarise parameter estimates for the chosen model, which all display typical features
common to return series. As expected, hidden regimes are identified by volatility.
Despite of the common findings state–specific return means differ significantly across
latent states, favouring the rejection of the null hypothesis that the conditional means
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Figure 1: (Top panel): cumulative returns of the BAC (red line), BK (dark line), C (green
line), JPM (yellow line), WFC (magenta) and S&P500 index (dark line), since January 1st,
1987 till the end of the period. (Middle panel): smoothed hidden states. (Bottom panel):
Expected Shortfall at the 5% level. Vertical dotted lines represent major financial downturns:
the “Black Monday”, (October 19, 1987), the “Black Wednesday” (September 16, 1992), the
Asian crisis (July, 1997), the Russian crisis (August, 1998), the September 11, 2001 shock, the
Bear Stearns hedge funds collapse (August 5, 2007), the Bear Stearns acquisition by JP Morgan
Chase, (March 16, 2008), the Lehman’s failure (September 15, 2008), the peak of the onset of
the recent global financial crisis (March 9, 2009) and the European sovereign-debt crisis of April
2010 (April 23, 2010, Greek crisis).
are equal. Means and variances differences across state exacerbate the visited state
persistence observed in our time series data. This can be evinced also by inspecting the
middle panel of Figure 1 depicting the Viterbi estimates of the regimes: the selected
MSM is able to recover the underlying structure, capturing periods of crisis as well
as stable phases. Indeed, according to state–specific return means, we identify two
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Multivariate Gaussian–MSM
L log-likelihood AIC BIC
2 132909.573 -265633.146 -265048.593
3 133511.106 -266736.211 -265837.383
4 134106.228 -267714.455 -265820.188
5 134250.024 -268101.829 -266149.362
6 134413.915 -267890.048 -265972.966
Multivariate t–MSM
L log-likelihood AIC BIC
2 137686.512 -275283.023 -274975.669
3 138085.711 -276029.421 -275544.484
4 138402.144 -277714.991 -276137.237
5 139088.495 -276546.288 -275665.205
6 138672.683 -277023.366 -275923.720
Table 2: Log-likelihood, AIC and BIC values for the multivariate Gaussian (MVN) and
Student-t (MVT) Hidden Markov models fitted to the panel of US banks and the S&P500
index. Bold faces indicates the selected model.
positive and two negative regimes. Furthermore, during a financial crisis (identified by
State 1 and State 4), stock returns experiences high negative average mean returns, and
variances are pretty large. Vice versa, during more stable phases (as those identified
by State 2 and State 3), instead, stock returns fluctuate around a positive mean, and
variances are relatively low. As a consequence, the selected multivariate MS Student–t
model is able to distinguish and cluster time periods corresponding to different risk–
returns profiles. This evidence is confirmed by observing the small estimated values for
the ν parameters detecting the presence of fat tails. Moreover, the estimated transition
probability matrix Q, which explains the evolution over time of state–switching, well
captures the low rate of regime switching. In particular, off–diagonal probabilities are
generally low. An interesting aspect is related to crisis periods: bursts in the crisis
(as those identified in State 4) can be likely followed by another crisis period with less
marked losses. Thus, coming out suddenly from a crisis period is unlikely. As known,
the persistence of regimes plays an important role in generating volatility clustering,
for which periods of high volatility are followed by high volatility, and periods of low
volatility are followed by low volatility.
Due to the multivariate approach considered here, we are able to identify different
spillover effects among stocks, measured by the state–specific correlations. As expected,
correlations are higher during crisis period than during more stable phases. This
evidence has several important consequences for the tail risk interdependence analysed
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in the next subsection. Nevertheless, even if parameter estimates can support the policy
decision making process they do not provide enough information to evaluate extreme
tail interdependence between stocks, and risk measures should be constructed on the
basis of the obtained parameter estimates.
5.3 Marginal contribution to systemic risk
One of the most important questions a systemic risk measure should answers is the
identification of institutions that are systematically more important or contribute more
to the vulnerability of the overall system. Using the methodology described in previous
sections, we are able to measure individual institutions’ systemic importance at each
point in time as well as their variation over time, especially during the financial crisis.
Moreover, such risk measures provide important monitoring tools for the market–based
macro–prudential or financial stability regulation.
For the basket of assets considered, we calculate the marginal contributions of
each institution to the overall systemic risk by means of the Shapley value. The top
panel of Figure 2 plots the overall systemic risk based on ∆MCoVaR and ∆MCoES
at τ1 = τ2 = 0.05. The total systemic risk is at its minimum level before the Bear
Stearns hedge funds collapse (August 5, 2007) and then increases significantly during
year 2007 till the middle of 2008, when Lehaman and Brothers failed (September
2009). Subsequently, the system experienced a long period (between September 2008
and March 2009) of financial instability and high volatility when the overall risk is at
its highest level. Then the total systemic risk decreased suddenly, reaching the pre–
Bear Sterns collapse level in the middle of 2009. This probably has been the major
consequence of the US Supervisory Capital Assessment Program (SCAP) conducted by
the Federal Reserve System to determine if the largest US financial organisations had
sufficient capital buffers to withstand the recession and the financial market turmoil
whose results were released on May 7, 2009. The market has calmed down till the first
round of European sovereign debt crisis in May 2010, after the Greece receiving the
aid with 14,5 billions euros, as documented by the decrease of the total systemic risk.
Almost a year later, (June 13, 2011), Standard & Poor’s has downgraded Greek debt
from B to CCC, and the total systemic risk raised sharply reaching the higher peak
after 2007–2009 financial crisis in summer 2011.
Concerning the total systemic risk exposure during the recent global financial crisis
of 2007–2008, we observe that it is about three time as much larger as it was during
the previous period (2002–2007) of financial stability and about two time larger than
it was during the 1987 financial crisis, except for the black Monday week, when we
observe pretty the same level as in 2008.
The medium and bottom panels of Figure 2 plot the individual marginal
contribution to the systemic risk calculated by means of the Shapley value ShVi
based on ∆MCoVaRi|Jd and ∆
MCoESi|Jd respectively. Here, the index i denotes each
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µ× 103 SPX BAC BK C JPM WFC
State 1 0.6888 -3.4629 -1.8248 -1.3567 -3.4742 0.6349
State 2 3.4713 4.3184 4.9317 5.2207 4.9884 3.9972
State 3 1.6648 1.8952 0.5980 0.0617 1.1678 0.8968
State 4 -9.3863 -13.9701 -12.1881 -23.4741 -9.2301 2.5614
Λ× 103 SPX BAC BK C JPM WFC
State 1 0.6730 3.0970 2.6547 3.3052 3.3422 2.0985
State 2 0.2341 1.1694 0.9673 1.4067 1.1136 0.8347
State 3 0.2285 0.3153 0.7392 0.5201 0.6806 0.2819
State 4 2.8634 37.8412 10.9080 60.3287 19.0749 23.9363
Ω1 SPX BAC BK C JPM WFC
SPX 1.0000
BAC 0.6127 1.0000
BK 0.5757 0.5842 1.0000
C 0.7242 0.6345 0.5504 1.0000
JPM 0.6217 0.6739 0.6226 0.6385 1.0000
WFC 0.5818 0.6528 0.5595 0.5552 0.5690 1.0000
Ω2 SPX BAC BK C JPM WFC
SPX 1.0000
BAC 0.5943 1.0000
BK 0.6213 0.6104 1.0000
C 0.6459 0.5798 0.5183 1.0000
JPM 0.6050 0.6334 0.6032 0.5545 1.0000
WFC 0.6670 0.5853 0.6008 0.5348 0.6035 1.0000
Ω3 SPX BAC BK C JPM WFC
SPX 1.0000
BAC 0.6247 1.0000
BK 0.6979 0.4915 1.0000
C 0.7316 0.6961 0.5790 1.0000
JPM 0.7751 0.6537 0.6762 0.7447 1.0000
WFC 0.6172 0.7156 0.5087 0.6695 0.6359 1.0000
Ω4 SPX BAC BK C JPM WFC
SPX 1.0000
BAC 0.7366 1.0000
BK 0.7447 0.7215 1.0000
C 0.6688 0.8040 0.6177 1.0000
JPM 0.7198 0.7728 0.7208 0.7613 1.0000
WFC 0.6798 0.8731 0.7579 0.7460 0.8287 1.0000
Table 3: ML parameter estimates of the selected Multivariate t–MSM with four components
where µ are locations while the diagonal matrix Λ and the full matrix Ω are such that
Σ = ΛΩΛ.
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ν
State 1 State 2 State 3 State 4
11.8208 13.1583 6.5634 13.8517
δ
State 1 State 2 State 3 State 4
1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Q State 1 State 2 State 3 State 4
State 1 0.9485 0.0302 0.0088 0.0125
State 2 0.0185 0.9785 0.0000 0.0030
State 3 0.0090 0.0000 0.9865 0.0045
State 4 0.1721 0.0221 0.0000 0.8057
Table 4: ML estimates of the initial probability δ and transition probability matrix Q of the
Markov chain for the selected MVT hidden Markov models.
individual institutions’ risk contribution calculated with respect to the market index
(S&P500). These two panels track the systemic risk importance of each financial
institution in percentage points. The level of systemic importance changes over time
and in particular during period of financial instability. Looking for example at the
bottom panel, displaying the ShVi based on the ∆
MCoESi|Jd , we observe that Citigroup
(C), (green line) is the bank that have the most systemic importance weights during
the whole period, whereas the systemic weights of all the remaining institutions in the
panel change quite a lot during period of financial turbulence as compared to their
level observed during periods of financial stability. In particular, before the 2007–2008
financial crisis Bank of America (BAC) (red line) and Wells Fargo (WFC) (magenta
line), display the lowest systemic risk contribution, followed immediately by JP Morgan
(JPM) (yellow line) and Bank of NY Mellow (BK) (dark line) having the larger risk
contributions. During the 2007–2008 financial crisis we observe two distinct phenomena:
the ordering of systemic importance and the level of individual systemic importance
change compare to the pre-crisis values. For example Wells Fargo (WFC) becomes the
less important during the crisis period; moreover some institutions, like for example
Bank of America, BAC, increase its systemic contribution while others, like for example
Wells Fargo (WFC) reduce it. Comparing the middle and the bottom panel of Figure 2
we observe some important differences concerning the ordering of systemic importance
during periods of crisis as compared with the non–crisis periods. This means that the
choice of the systemic risk measure effectively impacts the risk assessment process and
suggests that the subadditivity property should be taken into consideration even for
systemic risk measurement purposes. In fact, the documented discordance between
the two risk measures can be probably ascribed to the known coherence deficiency
of the VaR that rebounds on the CoVaR. Table 5 summarises the Shapley value ShVi
statistics based on ∆MCoVaRi|Jd and ∆
MCoESi|Jd respectively. The provided statistics
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Figure 2: (Top panel): total systemic risk measured by ∆CoVaR
τ1|τ1
k|S (gray line) and by
∆CoES
τ1|τ1
k|S (light gray line), where k denotes the S&P500 index and S denotes the set of indexes
of the remaining assets. (Middle panel): marginal contribution to systemic risk evaluated by
means of the Shapley value methodology ShVi based on ∆CoVaR, for all the banks in the panel.
(Bottom panel): marginal contribution to systemic risk evaluated by means of the Shapley value
methodology ShVi based on ∆CoES, for all the banks in the panel. BAC (red line), BK (dark
line), C (green line), JPM (yellow line) and WFC (magenta line).
Vertical dotted lines represent major financial downturns: the “Black Monday”, (October 19,
1987), the “Black Wednesday” (September 16, 1992), the Asian crisis (July, 1997), the Russian
crisis (August, 1998), the September 11, 2001 shock, the Bear Stearns hedge funds collapse
(August 5, 2007), the Bear Stearns acquisition by JP Morgan Chase, (March 16, 2008), the
Lehman’s failure (September 15, 2008), the peak of the onset of the recent global financial crisis
(March 9, 2009) and the European sovereign-debt crisis of April 2010 (April 23, 2010, Greek
crisis).
are conditional on the Markovian state identified by means of the Viterbi algorithm.
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Mean
Bank State 1 State 2 State 3 State 4
BAC 17.27% 16.45% 17.65% 25.14%
BK 18.02% 19.04% 21.10% 26.04%
C 28.86% 25.47% 24.04% 18.41%
JPM 17.22% 17.55% 20.58% 21.90%
WFC 18.63% 21.49% 16.64% 8.51%
Variance
Bank State 1 State 2 State 3 State 4
BAC 1.80% 0.85% 1.89% 2.22%
BK 2.29% 0.87% 0.95% 2.21%
C 3.41% 1.73% 1.99% 2.67%
JPM 1.73% 0.97% 1.18% 1.11%
WFC 2.32% 1.16% 1.03% 2.78%
Table 5: Summary statistics of the Shapley value.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we develop a multivariate model–based approach to measure tail
risk interdependences among institutions. We consider both Gaussian and Student–
t Markov Switching models accounting for multiple underlying risk–return profiles.
The proposed approach considers new tail interdependence risk measures ∆MCoVaR
and ∆MCoES which naturally extend and improve the Adrian and Brunnermeier [6]
ideas of ∆CoVaR and ∆CoES to the multiple joint occurrence of extreme distress
events. Analytical expressions for those measures are evaluated on the predictive
distributions in order to provide a forward–looking risk quantification. The Shapley
value methodology is then applied to combine those multiple risk measures into an
overall risk indicator that essentially distributes the risk among the market participants.
The idea behind this paper is to measure extreme risks characterised by a dynamic
Markov Switching evolution being able, at the same time, to capture the main empirical
evidence of stylised facts of financial returns. The developed methodology is applied
to five major US banks belonging to the Standard and Poor’s 500 index in order to
assess individual institutions’ marginal contribution to the systemic risk. Comparing
the Student–t and Gaussian results, we observe that the former assumption is preferred
by standard information criteria and this supports the use of fat tailed distributions for
financial data. Moreover, the choice of the Student–t distribution is also justified by
theoretical reasons because it allows to model non linear dependence among tail events
which is not possible under the multivariate Gaussian assumption. Our empirical results
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suggest that the marginal contribution to the systemic risk of individual banks varies
through time and particularly during periods of financial crisis it changes dramatically,
both in order of importance and in levels. A decomposition analysis shows that the
marginal contribution of individual banks to the systemic risk are determined mostly by
bank size, consistent with the “too-big-to-fail” paradigm. More importantly, we observe
that merging a model being able to correctly identify different volatility regimes with
systemic risk measures that account for contemporaneous multiple distresses, allows us
to well understand and predict the impact of financial market turmoils on individual
and systemic risks.
Concluding, our analysis provides useful suggestions for the ongoing discussion on
the imposition of capital requirements on systemically important institutions to prevent
financial system disasters spillover effects. Concerning this aspect its main implication
is that capital requirements should be based on forward looking risk measures being
able to account for the evolving economic and financial conditions. The model can be
extended to include exogenous information on individual institutions or by considering
long–run forecasting horizons which implies the redefinition of some of the considered
risk measures.
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A Expectation–Maximization algorithm
E–step: at iteration (m+ 1), the E–step requires the computation of the so–called
Q–function, which calculates the conditional expectation of the complete–data
log–likelihood given the observations and the current parameter estimates θ(m)
Q
(
θ,θ(m)
)
=
L∑
l=1
zˆ1,l log (δl) +
L∑
l=1
L∑
k=1
T∑
t=1
ẑzt,l,k log (ql,k)
+
L∑
l=1
T∑
t=0
zˆt,l
{
−p
2
log (2pi)− 1
2
log |Σl|
}
+
L∑
l=1
T∑
t=0
zˆt,l
{
−wt,l
2
(yt − µl)′Σ−1l (yt − µl)
}
+
L∑
l=1
T∑
t=0
zˆt,l
{νl
2
log
(νl
2
)
− log Γ
(νl
2
)}
+
L∑
l=1
T∑
t=0
zˆt,l
{νl
2
(log(wt,l)− wt,l) +
(p
2
− 1
)
log (wt,l)
}
,
where the conditional expectations zˆt,l = E (zt,l | y1, . . . ,yT ) and ẑzt,l,k =
E (zzt,l | y1, . . . ,yT ), ∀t = 1, 2, . . . , T and ∀l, k = 1, 2, . . . , L are computed via the
well-know Forward–Filtering Backward–Smoothing (FFBS) recursive algorithm
(see Baum et al. [12]). For an introduction to the FFBS algorithm we refer the
reader to the book of Fru¨hwirth-Schnatter [29].
M–step: at iteration (m+ 1), the M–step maximizes the function Q
(
θ,θ(m)
)
with
respect to θ to determine the next set of parameters θ(m+1). The updated
estimates of the hidden parameters, the mean vector µl, and the scale matrix
Σl are given by the following expressions:
δ
(m+1)
l = zˆ
(m)
1,l
q
(m+1)
l,k =
∑T
t=2 ẑz
(m)
t,l,k∑L
k=1
∑T
t=2 ẑz
(m)
t,l,k
µ
(m+1)
l =
∑T
t=1 zˆ
(m)
t,l wˆ
(m)
t,l yt∑T
t=1 zˆ
(m)
t,l wˆ
(m)
t,l
Σ
(m+1)
l =
∑T
t=1 zˆ
(r)
t,l wˆ
(m)
t,l
(
yt − µ(m+1)l
)(
yt − µ(m+1)l
)T
∑T
t=1 zˆ
(m)
t,l wˆ
(m)
t,l
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∀l = 1, 2, . . . , L, where w(m)t,l denotes the current estimate of the conditional
expectation of Wt given the observation at time t, yt, and zt,l = 1
wˆ
(m)
t,l =
ν
(m)
l + p
ν
(m)
l +
(
yt − µ(m)l
)
Σ
(m)
l
−1 (
yt − µ(m)l
) ,
∀t = 1, 2, . . . , T and ∀l = 1, 2, . . . , L. The updated estimate ν(m+1)l does not exist
in closed form but is given as the solution of the equation∑T
t=1 zˆt,l
(
log
(
wˆ
(m)
t,l
)
− wˆ(m)t,l
)
∑T
t=1 zˆt,l
− ψ
(
ν
(m)
l
2
)
+ log
(
ν
(m)
l
2
)
+ 1 +
+ψ
(
ν
(m)
l + p
2
)
− log
(
ν
(m)
l + p
2
)
= 0
where ψ(·) is the Digamma function. The solution can be determined by a
bisection algorithm or quasi–Newton methods. As an alternative, we adopt the
following approximation due to Shoham [46]
ν
(m+1)
l =
2
hl + log (hl)− 1 + a0
[
1 + erf
(
a1 log
(
a2
hl + log (hl)− 1
))]
,
with a0 = 0.0416, a1 = 0.6594, a2 = 2.1971, where erf (·) is the error function
and
hl ≡ −
∑T
t=1 zˆ
(m)
t,l
[
ψ
(
p+ν
(m)
l
2
)
+ log
(
2
ν
(m)
l
+
(
yt−µ
(m)
l
)
Σ
(m)
l
−1(
yt−µ
(m)
l
)T
)
− wˆ(m)t,l
]
∑T
t=1 zˆ
(m)
t,l
,
∀l = 1, 2, . . . , L.
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Appendix B
Proof — Proposition 3.1. Let Y be a univariate Student–t mixture defined as in
Proposition 3.1, then the τ–level TCE of Y is
TCEY (yˆ
τ ) = E (Y | Y ≤ yˆτ )
=
1
P (Y ≤ yˆτ )
∫ yˆτ
−∞
y
[
L∑
l=1
ηlT
(
y | µl, σ2l , νl
)]
dy
=
L∑
l=1
ηlFY
(
yˆτ , µl, σ
2
l , νl
)
P (Y ≤ yˆτ ) TCEY,l
(
yˆτ , µl, σ
2
l , νl
)
=
L∑
l=1
pilTCEY,l
(
yˆτ , µl, σ
2
l , νl
)
where P (Y ≤ yˆτ ) = ∑Ll=1 FY (yˆτ , µl, σ2l , νl) with FY (yˆτ , µl, σ2l , νl) and pil, ∀l =
1, 2, . . . , L defined as in Proposition 3.1. The TCE of each mixture component
TCEY,l
(
yˆτ , µl, σ
2
l , νl
)
, for l = 1, 2, . . . , L can be evaluated as
TCEY,l
(
yˆτ , µl, σ
2
l , νl
)
=
1
FY
(
yˆτ , µl, σ
2
l , νl
) ∫ yˆτ
−∞
yΓ
(
νl+1
2
)
Γ
(
νl
2
)√
σ2l piνl
[
1 +
(y − µl)2
νσ2l
]− ν+1
2
dy
and follows from standard integration results. 
Proposition A.1 (TCE for multivariate Gaussian distributions). Let Y be
a multivariate Gaussian random variable of dimension d, i.e. Y ∼ Nd (µ,ΛCΛ)
with Λ = Diag {σ1, σ2, . . . , σd} and correlation matrix C, then the multivariate tail
conditional expectation of Y, i.e. the mean of Y truncated below the threshold y˜, is
TCEY (y˜,µ,Λ,C) = µ+
ΛCφ̂z˜
Φ (z˜)
(A.1)
with
φ̂z˜ =

φ (zˆ1) Φ−1 (z˜1)
φ (zˆ2) Φ−2 (z˜2)
...
φ (zˆd)Φ−d (z˜d)
 (A.2)
where z˜ = Λ−1 (y˜ − µ), φ (·) denotes the pdf of the standardized Gaussian distribution
and
Φ−j (z˜j) =
∫
z≤z˜
φ (z) dz, ∀j = 1, 2, . . . , d. (A.3)
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and z¯ = Ω
− 1
2
22,j
(
z¯2,j −Ω22,jC−122,jC21,jC−11|2,j z˜j
)
, Ω22,j = [C22,j −C21,jC12,j ]−1.
Proof — Let Z ∼ Nd (0,C) be a d–dimensional Gaussian random variable, consider
Y = µ + ΛZ, then Y has a Gaussian distribution, i.e. Y ∼ Nd (µ,ΛCΛ), then the
TCE of Y is
TCEY (y˜,µ,Λ,C) = E (Y | Y ≤ y˜)
= µ+ΛE (Z | Z ≤ z˜)
= µ+ΛTCEZ (z˜,C) , (A.4)
where TCEZ (z˜,C), is the TCE of the Gaussian distribution Z ∼ Nd (0,C), and can
be evaluated as follows
TCEZ (z˜,C) = E (z, z ≤ z˜) ≡

E (z1, z ≤ z˜)
E (z2, z ≤ z˜)
...
E (zd, z ≤ z˜)
 . (A.5)
Let us consider E (zj, z ≤ z˜), ∀j = 1, 2, . . . , d, we have
E (zj, z ≤ z˜) =
∫
Z−j≤z˜−j
[∫
Zj≤z˜j
zjφ
(
zj, µ[j|−j], σ
2
[j|−j]
)
dzj
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
IntegralA
×φd−1 (z−j , 0,C−j,−j) dz−j , (A.6)
where µ[j|−j] = C[j,−j]C
−1
[−j,−j]zj , and σ
2
[j|−j] = 1 − C[j,−j]C−1[−j,−j]C[−j,j]. Let us now
consider the integral A: ∫
Zj≤z˜j
zjφ
(
zj, µ[j|−j], σ
2
[j|−j]
)
dzj,
applying transformation t =
zj−µ[j|−j]
σ[j|−j]
we get:∫
Zj≤z˜j
zjφ
(
zj, µ[j|−j], σ
2
[j|−j]
)
dzj = −σ[j|−j]φ
(
z˜j − µ[j|−j]
σ[j|−j]
, 0, 1
)
+Cj,−jC
−1
−j,−jz−jΦ
(
z˜j − µ[j|−j]
σ[j|−j]
, 0, 1
)
.
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Plugging this last expression into equation (A.6) we obtain
E (zj, z ≤ z˜) = −σ[j|−j]
∫
Z−j≤z˜−j
φ
(
z˜j − µ[j|−j]
σ[j|−j]
)
φd−1
(
z−j , 0,C[−j,−j]
)
dz−j︸ ︷︷ ︸
IntegralB
+Cj,−jC
−1
−j,−j
∫
Z−j≤z˜−j
z−jΦ
(
z˜j − µ[j|−j]
σ[j|−j]
, 0, 1
)
×φd−1
(
z−j , 0,C[−j,−j]
)
dz−j .
Considering now the integral B∫
Z−j≤z˜−j
φ
(
z˜j − µ[j|−j]
σ[j|−j]
)
φd−1
(
z−j , 0,C[−j,−j]
)
dz−j
=
∫
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1√
2pi
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{(
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σ2[j|−j]
}
× 1
(2pi)
d−1
2
1
|C[−j,−j]|
1
2
exp
{
−1
2
zT−jC
−1
[−j,−j]z−j
}
dz−j , (A.7)
and completing the square in the following way
zT−jC
−1
[−j,−j]z−j
+
(
z˜j − C[j,−j]C−1[−j,−j]z−j
)T
σ−1[j|−j]
(
z˜j − C[j,−j]C−1[−j,−j]z−j
)
= z˜Tj z˜j +
(
z−j − C[−j|j]C−1[−j,−j]C[−j,j]σ−1[j|−j]z˜j
)T
C−1[−j|j]
×
(
z−j − C[−j|j]C−1[−j,−j]C[−j,j]σ−1[j|−j]z˜j
)
(A.8)
it becomes∫
Z−j≤z−j
φ
(
z˜j − µ[j|−j]
σ[j|−j]
)
φd−1
(
z−j , 0,C[−j,−j]
)
dz−j
= (2pi)−
d
2 |C[−j,−j]|−
1
2
∫
Z−j≤z˜−j
exp
{
−1
2
(
z−j −C[−j|j]C−1[−j,−j]C[−j,j]C−1[j|−j]z˜j
)T
C−1[−j|j]
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(
z−j − C[−j|j]C−1[−j,−j]C[−j,j]C−1[j|−j] z˜j
)}
dz−j
=
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(2pi)
d−1
2 |C[−j,−j]| 12
∫
Z−j≤z˜−j
exp
{
−1
2
(
z−j − C[−j|j]C−1[−j,−j]C[−j,j]C−1[j|−j]z˜j
)T
C−1[−j|j]
×
(
z−j − C[−j|j]C−1[−j,−j]C[−j,j]C−1[j|−j] z˜j
)}
dz−j .
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Considering the transformation t = C
− 1
2
[−j|j]
(
z−j − C[−j|j]C−1[−j,−j]C[−j,j]C−1[−j|j]z˜j
)
and
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2
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(
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)
, the previous integral B
becomes ∫
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. (A.9)
Let now consider the last part of integral in equation (A.7)∫
Z−j≤z˜−j
z−jΦ
(
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∫
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z−j
∫
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∫
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E (z−j ,Z ≤ z˜)
= |C[−j,−j]|
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2E (z−j ,Z ≤ z˜) .
because |C| = |C[−j,−j]|σ2[j|−j]. Concluding, we have that:
E (zj , z ≤ z˜) = −σ[j,−j]φ (z˜j)
|C[−j|j]| 12
|C[−j|−j]| 12
Φ
(
C
− 1
2
[−j|j]
(
z˜−j − C[−j|j]C−1[−j,−j]C[−j,j]C−1[−j|j]z˜j
))
+C[j,−j]C
−1
[−j,−j]|C[−j,−j]|
1
2 E (z−j ,Z ≤ z˜) , (A.10)
for j = 1, 2, . . . , d. Let
zˆj ≡ E (zj, z ≤ z˜)
zˆ−j ≡ E (z−j, z ≤ z˜)
(A.11)
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rewriting the previous equation (A.12) as
zˆj − C[j,−j]C−1[−j,−j]|C[−j,−j]|
1
2 zˆ−j =
−σ[j,−j]φ (z˜j)
|C[−j|j]| 12
|C[−j|−j]| 12
Φ
(
C
− 1
2
[−j|j]
(
z˜−j − C[−j|j]C−1[−j,−j]C[−j,j]C−1[−j|j]z˜j
))
(A.12)
we get a system of d equation with d unknowns Azˆ = b where the matrix A has
diagonal elements ai,i = 1, for i = 1, 2, . . . , d, and off–diagonal elements ai,j and i 6= j
being the j–th element of the (d− 1)–dimensional vector −C[i,−i]C−1[−i,−i]|C[i,−i]|
1
2 , and
the vector b has the j–th generic element equal to
bj = −σ[j,−j]φ (z˜j)
|C[−j|j]|
1
2
|C[−j|−j]|
1
2
Φ
(
C
− 1
2
[−j|j]
(
z˜−j − C[−j|j]C−1[−j,−j]C[−j,j]C−1[−j|j]z˜j
))
(A.13)
for j = 1, 2, . . . , d. Solving the previous system of equations completes the proof.
Without loss of generality we can consider the case where d = 2 where
zˆ = E (z | z ≤ z˜) = A−1b
=
1
1− ρ2
[
1 ρ
ρ 1
] −
(
1− ρ2)φ (z˜1) Φ( z˜2−ρz˜1√
1−ρ2
)
− (1− ρ2)φ (z˜2) Φ( z˜1−ρz˜2√
1−ρ2
)

=
 −φ (z˜1) Φ
(
z˜2−ρz˜1√
1−ρ2
)
− ρφ (z˜2)Φ
(
z˜1−ρz˜2√
1−ρ2
)
−φ (z˜2) Φ
(
z˜1−ρz˜2√
1−ρ2
)
− ρφ (z˜1)Φ
(
z˜2−ρz˜1√
1−ρ2
)

= C
 −φ (z˜1)Φ
(
z˜2−ρz˜1√
1−ρ2
)
−φ (z˜2)Φ
(
z˜1−ρz˜2√
1−ρ2
)
 , (A.14)
with ρ = C[1,2]C
−1
[2,2]|C[1,2]|
1
2 . 
Proposition A.2 (TCE for multivariate Student–t distributions). Let Y be
a multivariate Student-t random variable, i.e. Y ∼ Td (µ,ΛCΛ, ν) with Λ =
Diag {σ1, σ2, . . . , σd}, correlation matrix C and degrees of freedom ν, then the
multivariate tail conditional expectation of Y is
E (Y,Y ≤ y˜) = µ+ΛCφ̂z˜ (A.15)
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with
φ̂z˜ =

φ (zˆ1) Φ−1 (z˜1)
φ (zˆ2) Φ−2 (z˜2)
...
φ (zˆd)Φ−d (z˜d)
 (A.16)
where z˜ = Λ−1 (y˜− µ), φ () denotes the pdf of the standardized Student–t distribution
and
Φ−j (z˜j) =
∫
z≤z˜
φ (z) dz, ∀j = 1, 2, . . . , d. (A.17)
and z¯ = Ω
− 1
2
22,j
(
z¯2,j −Ω22,jC−122,jC21,jC−11|2,j z˜j
)
, Ω22,j = [C22,j −C21,jC12,j ]−1.
Proof — The proof is exactly as that reported for the Gaussian case with the only
execption that here we exploit the scale representation of the Sutent–t distribution in
equation (2.3). 
Proposition A.3 (TCE for multivariate Gaussian and Student–t mixtures).
Let Y be a multivariate Gaussian (or Student–t) mixture, i.e. Y ∼∑L
l=1 ηlN (y | µl,Σl, )
(
orY ∼∑Ll=1 ηlT (y | µl,Σl, νl)), then the tail conditional
expectation of Y is a convex linear combination of the tail conditional expectations
of the components:
TCEY (y˜, L) =
L∑
l=1
pilTCEl (y˜) (A.18)
where the weights are pil = ηl
Φ(y˜,µl,Σl)∑L
l=1 ηlΦ(y˜,µl,Σl)
in the Gaussian case, and pil =
ηl
t(y˜,µl,Σl,νl)∑L
l=1 ηlt(y˜,µl,Σl,νl)
in the Student–t case, l = 1, 2, . . . , L, with
∑L
l=1 pil = 1 and Φ (·)
and t (·) denotes the Gaussian and Student–t cdf, respectively.
Proof — See Bernardi [13] for a similar proof involving Skew Normal mixtures. 
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